Thank you, Chairman, for calling this hearing, and I thank our witnesses for joining us today. We face, obviously,

significant challenges from Iran which has repeatedly shown

its unwillingness to play a responsible, constructive role in the

international community. By working with the U.N. Security Council,

with the broader international community, the administration

has sent a strong message to Iran—that it needs to address the

very serious and urgent concerns about the nature and extent of

its nuclear program. These sanctions, of course, must now be enforced

and strengthened. At the same time, it’s important to remember

that sanctions are meant to be a tool toward the resolution

of the Iranian nuclear problem, not an end in themselves. And I

hope that this hearing will provide a, you know, a better picture of our broader strategy and the plans going forth.

Under Secretaries Levey and Burns, I know you’ve touched on

this, but how effective should we expect international and U.S.

sanctions to be at limiting Iran’s ability to further advance its

nuclear program? First, in terms of the ability to enforce existing

and previous sanctions—do the various sanctions regimes have

strong enough enforcement tools in this regard and if not, what

more should we do about those? And additionally, in terms of the

ability of sanctions to slow down or curb Iran’s ability to continue

on with enrichment or to pursue weaponize efforts? Mr. Levey. Thank you.

Under Secretary Burns, I want to get a little deeper into something

that was already touched on—that our two-track effort appears

to be focusing mostly on the sanctions track at the moment.

But, given the need to prepare for various outcomes, does the

administration have a plan for what we want to get out of negotiations,

including our bottom-line demands, if Iran did come to the table?

And, again Under Secretary Burns, can you comment on the relationship between Iran and our friends and our

allies in the developing world? Particularly, to what extent does it

have openings for influence in Latin America with its Venezuelan

connection, and Africa, for example, Iran’s been reaching out diplomatically

to a number of countries in Africa, including Jabudi,

Kenya, the Camorros, Senegal, Uganda, the Gambia, and according

to press reports, stated that Tehran’s growing relations with African

countries were, ‘‘A priority for Iran’s foreign policy.’’ What are

we doing to reach out to our friends and allies in these regions to

express our concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, and are they being receptive to that?

Under Secretary Burns, the U.S.-Jordan

Nuclear Cooperation Agreement that’s currently being negotiated

has brought up the problematic issue that other Middle Eastern

countries are interested in developing their own enrichment and reprocessing

capability, or E&R. How can we minimize the danger

that Iran will perceive the development of any such capabilities as

threatening, and insist on maintaining its own E&R as a result,

given that Jordan does not seem to be interested in our offer providing

it with nuclear energy assistance in exchange for any agreement

to forgo E&R capabilities, and the nuclear supplier’s group is

not interested on a meaningful ban on E&R transfers, what is plan B for this situation?

And finally, Under Secretary Burns, the GAO recently released a report indicating that Iran continues to successfully divert United States-made military and other controlled

equipment and transfer—transship this equipment through such

countries as the U.A.E. What has the United States done to identify

and plug the loopholes in the export control regime that allow

this to happen, and has the United Arab Emirates implemented

the export control laws it’s committed to implement? Thanks to both of you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.